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Value beyond scientific Validity: Let’s RULE (Reliability, Utility, LEgitimacy) 
 
Matthias Wienroth, MA, PhD 
 









My perspective piece contributes to social studies of biometric technologies, and to studies on 
values and valuation within debates of responsible innovation. I reflect on innovation as social 
practice where values are temporary settlements of considerations around validity, operability, 
and social compatibility of socio-technical innovations. As such, I propose a practice-based 
approach to testing values in new technologies and their respective emerging practice and 
governance arrangements around Reliability, Utility and LEgitimacy (RULE). These three 
values combine scientific with operational and social aspects of innovation as centre-points 
around which deliberative engagement can be facilitated between different societal 
perspectives, offering the opportunity to develop greater awareness of diverse and at times 
competing understandings of value. On the case study of forensic genetics – the use of genetic 
material and data for policing purposes in security and justice contexts – I make the case for 
multi-perspectival, cross-disciplinary, community-grounded deliberation based on RULE. 
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Innovation as social practice 
In this perspective piece I reflect on the social nature of innovation, and argue for a practice-
informed approach to ethical deliberation that engages with concrete rather than abstract 
values. I propose an approach through which to facilitate dialogue about socio-technical 
innovation between different perspectives. This approach combines normative and practice-
oriented considerations via three values of responsibility in innovation – Reliability, Utility, 
LEgitimacy (RULE) – which provide currency to the criteria of anticipation, inclusion, 
institutional reflexivity, and responsiveness (AIRR) (Stilgoe et al. 2013) within the context of 
deliberative democracy. 
 
In December 2016, German public debate about deployment of DNA technologies in policing 
re-ignited in the wake of the recent sexual murder of Maria Ladenburger in the city of Freiburg. 
Suspicion quickly fell on the community of one million refugees coming to Germany in 
2015/16, particularly from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. Large parts of the media, politics and 
interest groups played to an assumed link between migration and criminality: In what appeared 
to be an effort to shore up security from crime perpetrated by visibly different foreigners, the 
debate quickly revolved around the introduction into police use of emerging genetic analyses 
that may be able to infer appearance – primarily eye, hair and skin pigmentation – and 
‘biogeographic ancestry’ (linking a person genetically to a population currently residing in a 
subcontinental geographic area) of unknown individuals, using biological traces found at 
scenes of crime (forensic DNA phenotyping).  
 
Despite the lack of utility of forensic DNA phenotyping (from here: FDP) in this murder 
investigation – the police identified suspect Hussein Khavari using common policing methods 
– a vocal prominent group of law enforcement officers, political opinion- and decision-makers 
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and scientists argued in favour of socio-technical innovation. They saw the deployment of FDP 
as legitimate even though it was not considered legal at the time, calling for a revision of the 
law to permit routine use in policing by ascribing significant value to them as law and order 
tools. The German Criminal Code of Conduct (Strafprozessordnung) had until then been 
interpreted to permit only sex determination and comparison of individual DNA profiles. FDP, 
however, may provide unique personal information about appearance, health, ancestry – based 
on probabilities derived from population reference data – of the trace donor (Kayser 2015, 
Phillips 2015). The reliability of such analyses; how they can best support police 
investigations; who should apply them; and who access their information, remain contested, 
reflecting a variety of competing values and interests (cf. Granja and Machado 2020, Samuel 
and Prainsack 2019, Wienroth 2018, 2020). While the German debate repeatedly referred to 
the permissive legal status for FDP in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands it took little 
note of context, use, and oversight there. This call for socio-technical innovation in the German 
criminal justice system focused on ‘Tagespolitik’ related to migration and crime management 
priorities while ignoring societal and institutional considerations around (non-)use of FDP in 
other countries. There was limited reflection on the circumstances in which FDP can be useful 
in police investigations, or how reliable the data from such analyses are, with most advocates 
citing only scientific literature on ‘ideal-type’ accuracy predictions for eye, hair and skin 
pigmentation analysis.1 
 
In December 2019, the Strafprozessordnung, a federal law, was amended to include the 
inference of appearance2, but not the prediction of ‘biogeographic ancestry’, in part based on 
contestations of the legitimacy of a DNA-based notion of ‘race’ (cf. Lipphardt et al. 2018). 
 
1 Further detail of critiques in the German debate can be found in Buchanan et al. 2018, Lipphardt 2017, 
Lipphardt 2018, Momsen 2017, Pfaffelhuber 2017, Ray 2018, Staubach et al. 2017. 
2https://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Gesetzgebungsverfahren/Dokumente/BGBl_Modernisierung_Strafverfahren.
pdf (in German, accessed 8 July 2020). 
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While the German state needed to be seen to be active in addressing criminality that has been 
associated with migration, its legislators were also aware of the history of race science and 
eugenics particularly in the 20th century, and the cognitive error in associating genetic data, 
which seemingly fit into social categories, with naturalising such categories (the fallacy of 
biological racial populations). The legislature in the German state of Bavaria, however, 
introduced both analyses in the Bavarian Policing Act 2018, on the basis of their assumed value 
for building resilience to ‘imminent danger’3. Meanwhile, in the USA and elsewhere, private 
providers offer proprietary genetic analyses for appearance, ancestry, and familial kinship 
including genealogy (cf. Kennett 2019, Phillips 2018, Syndercombe-Court 2018). The process 
of socio-technical innovation there has overtaken the capacity of existing governance structures 
to provide guided oversight in a heavily commercialised forensic market. At the same time, 
new technological innovations are underway in a field broadly described as ‘forensic 
(epi)genomics’ (Vidaki and Kayser 2017, Scudder et al. 2018), suggesting future capacity to 
infer health-relevant and life-style information from genetic material. 
 
Initially, the German debate did not include a discussion of social context and innovations that 
necessarily go hand-in-hand with the introduction of new technological capacities into practice. 
And when it did, key decision-makers in Government and Police still deferred to scientific 
assurances of innovative potential (Lipphardt 2018). When it comes to socio-technical 
innovation in security and justice contexts globally, science, law and the state operate as core 
communities in decision-making. Recently, victim representatives4 and commercial service 
providers5 have acquired a stronger role in public debate on criminal justice innovations. 
 
3 Polizeiaufgabengesetz (PAG) Bayern, Art.32.4 (https://www.gesetze-bayern.de/Content/Document/BayPAG-
32 in German, accessed 8 July 2020). 
4 E.g. Karina Vetrano’s family advocating for familial searching in New York (2017), or Elizabeth Smart’s 
father – over a decade after her rescue from kidnapping – calling on the public to donate DNA to 
FamilyTreeDNA.com in televised adverts (2019). 
5 E.g. see the aggressive marketing of forensic capabilities by Parabon Nanolabs in the USA. 
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However, these are extraordinary interventions. More can and needs to be done in terms of 
routine inclusivity of a broader palette of epistemic cultures and communities: a plurality of 
perspectives can and will better anticipate social convergences (cf. Wienroth & Rodrigues 
2015) arising from technological innovations in practice (cf. Barben et al. 2008, Guston 2014). 
Within such a deliberative approach, we also need to do better in terms of providing a 
practicable basis for responsible deliberation that combines empirical with normative aspects 
(cf. Kon 2009). 
 
The example of forensic genetics in criminal justice reflects on the social, even political nature 
of the ways in which socio-technical innovations are debated, legitimised and deployed. Look 
into how advanced genetic analyses are developed – e.g. how reference population data are 
created – and it becomes apparent that the basis for such innovations is not neutral: Scientific 
and technical considerations are subject to social communication and human nature, 
technological innovations are as much embedded within their societal context as they 
contribute to the shaping of social order and social practices. Sheila Jasanoff’s (2004) notion 
of the co-production of technology and social orders, and Lynch and McNally’s (2009) concept 
of biolegality – the interlinking of technology, practice and the social norms and legal 
frameworks governing both – have persuasively reflected on the situated social nature of socio-
technical innovation. For forensic technologies, this context consists of scientific cultures and 
practices in research and case work; legal and regulatory frameworks; policing cultures and 
investigative practices; the market (forensic service provision and technology development); 
subjects of technology use (e.g. victims and their families, suspect individuals or communities); 
and public debates (e.g. catastrophising and criminalising migration). These constitute the 
deliberative horizon within which innovation is negotiated, materialised or closed down. They 
constitute the political economy of socio-technical innovation, the complex entanglements of 
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diverse communities, discourses and practices, be they academic, lab-based, policing, 
commercial etc., that mark innovation as social practice (for FDP cf. Wienroth 2020). For the 
stage of adoption into material practice (cf. Tomlin et al. 2012), innovation has been described 
as “distributed effect” (Sorensen 2007) based on its relational materiality in the entanglement 
of scientific, physical and social aspects: Innovation has material quality as well as object 
agency. The example of socio-technical innovation around enhanced forensic genetics analyses 
lends itself well to this point since it is steeped in DNA, chromosomes and alleles, mouth 
swabs, testing kits and analysis machines etc. as physical representations of suspicion, security 
and criminal justice. Socially, it is more widely distributed in policing and legal instruments as 
well as in the quality and nature of professional and public discourses about law and order, 
criminality, otherness, and migration that may lead to adoption, appropriation, and further 
innovation. 
 
Enabling responsibility to RULE innovation 
The German FDP debate shows how differing values play out in socio-technical innovations, 
illuminating them as social processes of valuing (cf. Helgesson and Muniesa 2013, Muniesa 
2012, Boenink and Kudina 2020), and emphasising that deliberation of values of and in 
practice is vital in innovation processes. Extant RI scholarship provides structured procedural 
values for approaching intervention in such processes (Pellé 2016). Equally, through inclusive 
modes of engagement across various publics, policymakers and practitioners, responsible 
innovation makes space for the debate, production, and recognition of public values (Taebi et 
al. 2014). Such negotiation of values benefits from transparency and clarity in communication 
as well as perception of the issues at stake. However, communication can be challenging (Blok 
2014), especially when values are not scrutinised, or if material, concrete elements of 
innovation are under-explored in favour of abstract concerns (e.g. the idea that any tool that 
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may help in ‘catching a killer’ should be made available, irrespective of its scientific, 
operational, and societal limitations and impacts). Within this normative deliberative frame, I 
offer some granularity and accessibility in proposing three values – Reliability, Utility, 
LEgitimacy – that provide practical guidance for an anticipatory, inclusive, reflective and 
responsive innovation process. These values form a ‘golden’ RULE based on three dialogical 
questions asked of the technology, its potential adoption and distribution into practice, and its 
wider societal context:  
 
1. Is the technology Reliable in delivering on expectations about its use?  
2. Does it provide Utility to the task at hand (who defines ‘useful’ and ‘successful use’)?  
3. Does its application/deployment satisfy questions of wider social LEgitimacy?  
 
These questions – which help make complex innovation processes accessible to involved non-
philosophical and non-academic communities – have emerged from my analytical work with 
social scientists, ethicists, civil society organisations, scientists, laboratory practitioners, and 
policy makers in forensic genetics, biometrics, and the life sciences more widely, including in 
the German debate on legislating FDP 2016-2019 (e.g. Wienroth and Lipphardt 2017). 
 
RULE relies on inclusion, calling on stakeholder communities to participate in reflection and 
anticipation. The RULE values help open up discussion, enabling engagement because they 
start from an epistemic perspective, drawing from empirical and experiential – concrete – 
knowledge about specific socio-technical innovation, rather than abstract principles. 
Importantly, we need to be aware of the potentially very diverse aspects that make up 
reliability, utility, and legitimacy. These aspects must be critically discussed and constructively 
challenged to explore their links to specific issues, interests, and contexts within which they 
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need to be considered. In this deliberative process it is vital to draw on diverse forms of 
epistemic cultures, e.g. to address unconscious bias when discussing reliability and utility. For 
the example of forensic genetics, these cultures include forensic scientists and geneticists, 
police, constitutional and legal experts, political decision-makers, civil society organisations 
(as subjects to technology effects, e.g. minority organisations, victim groups), social 
commentators and ethicists, sociologists, anthropologists, criminologists, Science and 
Technology in Society (STS) scholars, as well as public and private forensic service providers. 
This is a long list of many expertises and insights, which it may be difficult to bring together 
and to get to communicate with each other, but considering the potentially severe impacts of 
socio-technical innovation on civil liberties, social order and life, potentially aggravating 
existing inequalities and inequities, such plurality lies at the heart of ethical and legitimate 
deliberation in liberal democracies. 
 
Reliability 
Reliability entails epistemic validity, veracity of data work, and user capacity. I argue that we 
need to understand these elements broadly as the thing in itself as well as those involved in 
producing/working/changing/interpreting the thing. 
 
A key test for reliability lies in a technology’s scientific basis, its epistemic validity6. While 
validity in its narrowest sense is based on proof of principle, reliability also means achieving 
transparency about potentially inherent, and often invisible bias pertaining to data that informs 
technology. Bias derives from personal and cultural practices, prejudices, from social 
structures7, and from the inherently social – and political – nature of data of/about/by humans, 
 
6 When referring to epistemic validity I draw on Knorr Cetina’s (2007) “machineries of knowledge production” 
to indicate the broader structural, cultural and societal aspects of data production/use/governance. 
7 For example, structural racism disadvantages communities because of how the system works, not necessarily 
because of racist intent in individual human action. 
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also reflected in genetic research (cf. Lipphardt 2010, Saini 2019). As such, bias can also be 
incidental, unwanted, unrecognised by those subject to it. This offers another rationale for a 
plurality of views, experiences and expertise in innovation debates. Deliberation of epistemic 
validity of data, therefore, requires transparency about the context of, and structures that drive 
or enable socio-technical innovation. In the end, this is the baseline on which technology-
enabled analysis will be performed and, by impacting on data created by technology-enabled 
analysis, inform social actions such as criminal justice investigations and trials.  
 
Epistemic validity is closely related, therefore, to veracity of data work. With this type of 
veracity, I draw attention to the processes and agents involved in the production, curation, and 
use of databases and technologies as well as the analysis data informed and co-produced 
through such repositories and tools. What are their biases (in the same understanding as 
developed above, with emphasis on social context and structural embedding), are data workers 
aware of these, and how can such biases be mitigated? Therefore, veracity of data work refers 
to an understanding of how data are produced in technology-enabled enquiries and analyses. 
Veracity as a concept may have a positivist etymology, but for RULE purposes it is used to 
raise awareness to the need for procedural, not deterministic, testing of data work and data. As 
such, commitment to veracity here means establishing awareness of, as well as steps to identify 
and disclose, limitations of data technologies and their data. The informational content of data 
is an important aspect here (linking veracity closely to user capacity, see below), as is the 
question of compatibility of data processes and agents with the technical, and in turn social, 
capacity of the technology. A point raised time and again by oversight bodies here is that of 
confirmation bias: can users perceive the complexity of the social and often ambiguous data? 
In case of forensic DNA phenotyping, this can lead to misunderstanding the analysis and its 
probabilities (cf. Samuel and Prainsack 2019), potentially resulting in excluding specific 
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appearance characteristics or population groups prematurely, or including others that later turn 
out to have little to no bearing on the investigation. These genetic attribution technologies and 
their related socio-legal innovations, e.g. in legislation and policing practice, have already 
shown to be subject to a variety of bias and misconceptions (see, e.g., Hansard Col 168W 2005, 
McCartney 2006, Phillips 2015, Travis 2009, Tutton et al. 2014), making the discussion of 
RULE explicitly important. Another element here is technology capacity: when it comes to 
technology deployment, potential users need to be able to understand if technology 
development has reached a readiness level at which analysis data can not only make statements 
relevant to the aim of its use (‘does it do what it says on the tin’), but at which error margins 
are sufficiently low. There needs to be consensus on how to manage unavoidable error margins, 
and what their limits look like. Equally, consensus is needed about the analytical framework. 
For example, what analysis and analysis tools, such as (open source) software, can be used; 
and how can data be interpreted reliably (‘what’s in the tin’)?  
 
This has clear repercussions for user capacity, the use of socio-technical innovations in 
practice, such as in criminal investigations. Should data be used internally by the police, or can 
they be shared as part of a public appeal for information? If the latter, how can this be done in 
order to receive information from the public that can be used reliably and without endangering 
social order? Are data sufficiently unequivocal? In the end, reliability is always also a question 
of cross-checking information. In order to have user capacity, users need to be able to rely on 
disclosure of epistemic validity and have an understanding of the meaning of data veracity. 
This opens up questions of proprietary aspects of technology if offered as part of a commercial 
contract, e.g. in analysis software, outsourced data analysis, and generally in the delivery of 
routine and advanced forensic services (cf. Lawless and Williams 2010, Roberts 1996, 
Wienroth 2020). These are ongoing discussions, especially as commercial services providers 
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grow in significance in some markets, e.g. the USA, and consolidate their range of services 
due to economic practices such as block-contracting and streamlined reporting requirements in 
others, e.g. the UK. 
 
Utility 
Utility considerations are closely linked to questions of reliability. The utility of an innovation 
depends on its operational value, e.g. if and how a technology and its analysis can add value 
to an investigation, and, ideally, includes strong consideration of how it can do so effectively. 
This needs to be accompanied by open discussion about the operational meaning of 
‘effectiveness’ and ‘success’ of an intervention based on innovation. Scientific success in a 
case using forensic genetics technologies might not lead to investigative success, as shown in 
the example of the Phantom of Heilbronn (Lipphardt 2019). And effectiveness remains a 
difficult to measure concern of the criminal justice system (Amankwaa and McCartney 2019). 
Without clarity on these points, utility cannot be established satisfactorily.  
 
More broadly, this point relates to questions of public/social order since technology 
deployment in the criminal justice system stands in service of (re-)establishing social order 
after a crime. Potential infringements of civil liberties and human dignity via technology 
deployment, however, can have a deleterious effect here if seen to be used without cause, or 
when used in inappropriate ways. Using forensic DNA phenotyping techniques to infer an 
unknown suspect’s potential ancestry and appearance, and sharing probability-based 
information without explanation publicly, can inadvertently fuel cultural prejudices, leading to 
ill will (or even violence) against minority groups. The analytical concept of ‘crimmigration’ 
in legal studies has taken stock of how immigration of some groups has increasingly been made 
a domain of criminal law (Garcia Hernandez 2013, Stumpf 2006), providing part of the cultural 
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and structural context for the desire to innovate in order to better identify where a person comes 
from and how to protect against them. The German FDP debate provides a case in point of the 
merging of migration and criminal justice discourses and practices.  
 
Equally, the considered use of such technologies, accompanied by appropriate training of 
criminal justice stakeholders on limitations and effects of technologies, as well as sensitive 
community relationships, can defuse critical challenges to public order arising from 
information shared, thus be useful to policing. One example is the early Marianne Vaatstra 
murder investigation when forensic phenotypical analysis suggested a white man as potential 
perpetrator in the Netherlands. This contributed to calming aggressions against a local 
community of asylum seekers who had initially been seen as implicated in the murder (cf. Jong 
and M’charek 2018). Here, investigators and citizens respected the limitations of the veracity 
of the data work in technology use. Therefore, the utility of socio-technical innovations, 
including the deployment of technologies, is closely linked to questions of reliability, and both 
values need to be considered carefully in tandem. The case can be made for their usefulness, 
but it stands to reason that, e.g., blanket deployment of specialist technology such as forensic 
DNA phenotyping does not generate operational value to an investigation. But it may cause 
damage to social order, such as civil unrest, violence, or social persecution based on an 
assumed identity and/or perception of race. In terms of informational utility8, mechanisms need 
to be established through which findings are communicated accessibly to science-lay users 
such as police detectives, prosecutors, lawyers, investigating magistrates, potential jurors (cf. 
Scudder et al. 2019). 
 
 
8 Informational utility needs to consider the following questions: what can we learn from technology 
deployment; how can data be made useful; what are the differences between intelligence (something forensic 
DNA phenotyping can provide) and evidence (something phenotyping cannot) in terms of information and in 
terms of implications for investigative practices. 
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Legitimacy 
Legitimacy is about justification, trust, and social relationships. Legality, proportionality (an 
often imprecisely defined legal and political concept, cf. Urbina 2012) and other mostly 
technical terms are expressions of that value as its limited temporary settlements. Indeed, 
before a norm becomes law, its legitimacy is negotiated and contested at various levels. In 
these processes, the multi-perspectival deliberation of innovation is a vital tool in exploring 
legitimacy. Therefore, legitimacy of and in innovation is tested continuously and can be 
measured, e.g., in the relationship of technology deployment to ethical, moral, social, legal and 
other costs. Legitimacy testing needs to take place in the form of a broad discussion – between 
a diversity of perspectives from science, social science, ethics, politics, law, criminal justice, 
and civic society organisations including the voices of those often not heard – prior to the 
potential introduction of a technology for security and criminal justice purposes. In the context 
of legislation and/or regulation of technologies, and importantly also in the context of legal 
activities and legal restrictions, often new understandings of legitimacy are negotiated. Here, 
it is vital to attend to the political context and the political economy of debating the introduction 
of novel technologies: What has caused the call for change; which perspectives are heard, and 
which are given priority and why; are opportunities and successes of technology deployment, 
technical and operational limitations and challenges, as well as reliability and utility discussed 
equally? Ideally, the legitimacy of deploying technologies, which can lead to – at times justified 
– infringement of human dignity and civil liberties, should also be tested routinely in practice, 
e.g. by independent, preferably statutory, advisory bodies (such as the Biometrics 
Commissioners in England & Wales and Scotland). Important here is the reflection on existing 
– or lack thereof – legal and regulatory instruments that govern the deployment of technologies 
and, importantly, the retention of and access to data they produce.  
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Deliberative innovation is democratic 
In attending to Reliability, Utility, and Legitimacy as key values in the deliberation of socio-
technical innovations, we can actively incorporate values beyond those of technical capacity 
and economic worth when it comes to valuing science and technology, as part of responsible 
innovation. RULE supports accountability of innovation by increasing transparency while 
reducing the complexity of communicating about innovation by breaking down issues, and thus 
enhancing the capacity for inclusion of a plurality of perspectives in deliberation. Diversity in 
perspectives here is key, drawing on different experiences, knowledges and roles of stakeholder 
communities, be they involved in producing, using, consuming, governing or commissioning 
of, or being subject to, socio-technical innovation. Above and beyond that, we need to deepen 
and entrench consciousness of the social nature of technology development and deployment in 
considerations of responsibility. For example, Reliability, Utility, and Legitimacy as core 
values cannot be fulfilled by relying solely on scientific validation of a technology and its 
deployment in society. Instead, a more comprehensive approach is required to support the 
endeavour of providing equitable ‘public goods’ to a plurality of publics. While this paper does 
not offer the space to develop RULE into a comprehensive system of validation as valuation 
practice, constituted by epistemic, operational and societal validation (I am, however, working 
on this), RULE provides vital practical values for socially responsible innovation inclusive of 
multi-perspectival, cross-disciplinary engagement and debate in the public domain. 
Democratic deliberation of technological innovation requires well-informed, transparent and 
inclusive public debate, especially – as in the case of forensic genetics – when it comes to the 
use of scientific knowledge and socio-technological innovations that draw on the life sciences, 
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